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Abstract—Tactical unmanned vehicles are commonly used to
conduct tasks (e.g. monitor and surveillance) in various civilian
applications from a remote location. The characteristics of the
wireless communication link allows attackers to monitor and
manipulate the operation of the unmanned vehicle through
passive and active attacks. Cryptography is selected as a coun-
termeasure to mitigate these threats; however, a drawback of
using cryptography is the impact on the energy consumed
by the unmanned vehicle as energy is often constrained and
limits the duration of the mission time. This paper introduces
the Lightweight Encryption Operation Permutation Addition
Rotation and Diffusion (LEOPARD) cryptographic primitive
with a benchmark performance analysis against the standardised
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Results indicate that
LEOPOARD is a feasible encryption approach in comparison
to the AES encryption algorithm for unmanned vehicles with an
average performance increase of 8%.
Index Terms—Cryptographic primitives, Unmanned Vehicles,
Secure Communications, Energy Conservation, Encryption
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of unmanned vehicles has become common
in civilian scenarios that require teleoperation from remote
location (e.g. hazardous or inaccessible areas) [1]. Wireless
communication links are selected to communicate with
unmanned vehicles through the use of radio frequency (RF)
to transmit and receive messages between the base-station
and mobile vehicle. Advisories within range may conduct
passive and active attacks against the communication link due
to the broadcast nature of the wireless communication link [2].
Cryptography is selected to mitigate these attacks, however,
the selection of the cryptographic algorithm had influenced
the performance and operation of the unmanned vehicle [3],
[4]. As unmanned vehicles have limited energy supplies, the
selection of standardised cryptographic approaches may not
be suited for this context [5], [6]. The contributions of this
paper are the Lightweight Encryption Operation Permutation
Addition Rotation and Diffusion (LEOPARD) cryptographic
primitive based on the Permutation Substitution Network
(PSN) design paradigm [7] with comparison of the LEOPARD
and standardised AES cryptographic primitive is presented.
The structure of this paper is organised as follows: Section
II introduces the problem formulation. Section III conducts a
problem analysis based on the problem formulation. Section
IV presents existing literature relevant to the problem scope;
Section V proposes the LEOPARD cryptographic primitive.
Section VI presents the results obtained from the software
benchmark experiments undertaken between LEOPARD and
AES cryptographic primitives. Section VII discusses the im-
pact of the benchmark results in the context of tactical UAV.
Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section introduces the problem formulation. The prob-
lem examined is an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operated
over a digital wireless communication link from a remote
location. The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) policy
states that the maximum operating range of the UAV is 500m
(1640ft) line of sight distance and 120m (400ft) height [8].
The classification of a tactical UAV is based on the guidelines
of the CAA regulations. Figure 1 presents an overview of the
scenario.
Figure 1. Illustrative concept of a point to point link for fixed wing UAV
communication
A single hop point to point network is presented to transmit
data between the base-station and the tactical UAV. The
communication between the operator and the tactical UAV
is full-duplex over two individual links; a link is designated
as the uplink where command and control messages are
transmitted between the base-station and UAV; the remaining
link is assigned as the downlink for streaming data (e.g. sensor
readings) from the UAV to the base-station. It is assumed that
the maximum operation flight time for the tactical UAV in this
context is not greater than 2 hours.
III. PROBLEM ANALYSIS
The UAV is susceptible to security vulnerabilities due
to the nature of the wireless communication link; both
passive and active attacks can influence the operation of
the UAV. Vulnerabilities considered in this paper include
man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks and spoofing attacks
A successful security attack may result in the UAV
becoming unsafe and unreliable. The application of
standardised security measures may not be suited for
this scenario due to the real-time operational requirements of
the UAV [9], [10].
The wireless communication link broadcasts to devices
within proximity, an attacker could passively monitor the
data transmitted and undertake active attacks. Confidentiality,
integrity and authentication are selected to provide a secure
communication link; however, the repercussions on the per-
formance and operation of the UAV is a problem as the
focus is targeted for tactical UAV devices; an instance of the
performance and operation becoming affected is the maximum
flight duration with tactical UAV devices have limited battery
lifetime for the short mission duration.
IV. LITERATURE REVIEW
This section introduces literature relevant to the context of
this paper with focus on methodologies used to secure the
wireless communication link for tactical UAV. The literature
review is sectioned into two areas, first the current approaches
undertaken by other researches, followed by a summary of
the literature review undertaken.
Priyadharshini et al; introduce an energy and mobility
based group key management in mobile ad-hoc networks
[11]. The problem discussed by the authors is the issue of
applying secure communications to mobile MANETs as the
energy and mobility constraints and a requirement of an
efficient key management scheme is required. The proposed
solution presented by the authors was the energy and mobility
based group key management which is an identification
based key management scheme. Tests undertaken on the
proposed scheme was undertaken in the simulation NS2.
Results presented by the authors show the number of nodes
participating in the MANET increased the latency generated
for the key generation, this trend was also present for the
energy consumption..
Jiang et al; research energy optimisation of security-critical
real-time applications with guaranteed security protection
[12]. The authors investigate the problem of the design of a
secure and energy efficient real-time embedded system with
the objective of minimising energy consumed based on the
energy constraints on mobile applications such as UAV. The
test platform selected by the authors was simulated based
on the measurements obtained from a preliminary test of
the time and energy readings of various security algorithms
sampled on an ARM S3C2440 CPI operating at 500 MHz
and 64 MB of RAM. Results from the preliminary results
indicate that stream cipher RC4 consumed the least time and
energy whilst triple data encryption standard (3DES) induced
the longest time and had the highest energy consumption.
The impact of trust-based security association and mobility
on the delay metric in MANET is presented by Nguyen et al;
[13]. The problem discussed by the authors is the broadcast
delay induced from broadcast authentication between devices
on the MANET and the effect of the delay on the overall
system. The proposed solution presented in this research is
a mathematical model for analysing the delay of epidemic
broadcasts in MANET and benchmarked against the results
obtained from a simulated environment. Results presented
by the authors indicates that the mathematical model and
the simulation correlate for fixed density of nodes at varying
velocities with larger delays reported at lower velocities. The
density of nodes in an area influences the delay induced
with larger density of nodes reducing the delay incurred.
The security handshake delay measured indicated that the
simulation results have a reduced effect for on the delay
measured in comparison to the mathematical model results.
The literature review indicates that current research has
highlighted the requirement for secure communication for
unmanned vehicles is required with some consideration for
operational and performance constraints; however, the cryp-
tographic design methodology has not been explicitly stated
or implemented in previous research reviewed to determine
if the proposed solution is suited towards the context of
remote controlled vehicles. This paper analyses a new design
paradigm of cryptographic block ciphers for the application of
tactical UAV.
V. PROPOSED DESIGN
This section introduces the proposed LEOPARD design
methodology for mobile platforms. This section is categorised
into two sections, first the justification for the selection of
AES block cipher is discussed, followed by the explanation
of the LEOPARD block cipher design.
AES is a National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) standardised block cipher designed to provide
confidentiality for a data size of 128-bits using cryptographic
keys of 128, 192 or 256-bit sizes [14]. AES is a block cipher
that uses the SPN design paradigm.
For this paper the block cipher AES was selected as it
is the de-facto standard. AES uses the SPN paradigm and
comprises of three functions which are the substitution byte,
shift rows and mix columns. The substitution function is a
non-linear substitution step where each byte is replaced with
another according to a lookup. The shiftrows transposition
step where each row of the state is shifted cyclically a certain
number of steps. The mixcolumn is a mixing operation which
operates on the columns of the state, combining the four
bytes in each. The addroundkey is where each byte of the
state is combined with the round key using bitwise exclusive
or (XOR).
The LEOPARD cryptographic primitive uses the permuta-
tion substitution network paradigm PSN presented in previous
research [7]. The pseudo code configuration of LEOPARD and
AES cryptographic primitives is presented in Figure 2.
AES
Round(State, RKey)
{
SubByte(State);
ShiftRows(State);
MixColumn(State);
AddRKey(State, RKey);
}
SubByte(State);
ShiftRows(State);
AddRKey(State, RKey);
LEOPARD
Round(State, RKey)
{
MixColumn(State);
AddRKeyAdd(State, RKey);
ShiftRows(State);
}
SubByte(State);
ShiftRows(State);
AddRKey(State, RKey);
Figure 2. Pseudo code of conventional AES cryptographic primitive (Left)
and the LEOPARD cryptographic primitive (Right)
LEOPARD first mixes the input data, followed by the addi-
tion of the round key to the data stream; the permutation using
the shift rows, the substitution follows before an additional
permutation with the shiftrows in the final round. The bytes
are XOR’d with the round key to derive the cipher-text is
output. Generation of the substitution box is achieved using a
method based on practitioners preference. The design of the
LEOPARD cryptographic primitive was inspired by the novel
approaches presented in previous work [15].
VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT
This section discusses the result and analysis of the
experiments undertaken. The experiment undertook a direct
comparison between the LEOPARD and AES cryptographic
primitives. Implementation of LEOPARD and AES was
constructed in software. The analysis of the results were
conducted using statistical tests on the cipher-text output. The
two statistical methods selected to draw comparison between
the cryptographic primitives were the arithmetic mean and the
serial-correlation test. The arithmetic mean formula and serial
correlation formula is presented in Formula 1 and Formula 2.
A = 1n
∑n
i=1 ai
Formula 1: Arithmetic mean formula.
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Formula 2: Pearson’s correlation co-efficient formula
The arithmetic mean sums the bytes of the cipher-text output
and divides by the file length; as the data is packaged into
byte values; the ideal arithmetic mean for the cipher-text is
127.5-bits as half the value of a single byte is 127.5-bits. The
serial correlation measures the extent to which each byte in
the file depends upon the previous byte; the closer the value
is to zero the more random the cipher-text output is as it is
uncorrelated, correlation closer to positive or negative value
of one indicates a non random output. Table I tabulates the
comparison of entropy, arithmetic mean and serial correlation
between LEOPARD and AES at for a 256 byte message at ten
rounds.
Table I
COMPARISON OF LEOPARD AND AES FOR A 256 BYTE PAYLOAD AT TEN
ROUNDS
AES LEOPARD
Entropy value 7.11 7.19
Arithmetic
mean
123.9 134.7
Serial-
Correlation
0.02 0.07
The LEOPARD cryptographic primitive was 7.2 bits
difference from the ideal mean random in contrasts to the
AES of bits difference of 3.6. The standard deviation for the
arithmetic mean for AES is 5.4 whilst LEOPARD is 14.4.
Table 3 tabulates the results of the serial-correlation test
between the AES and LEOPARD cryptographic primitives at
ten rounds. The entropy score recorded for LEOPARD was
7.19 bit entropy in comparison to 7.11 recorded for AES with
a difference of 0.07.
Analysis of the serial correlation co-efficient tests for AES
was closer to an ideal serial correlation co-efficient score of
0.00 in comparison to LEOPARD. The standard deviation
of the correlation co-efficient scores indicates AES had a
standard deviation score of 0.01 whilst the standard deviation
for LEOPARD was 0.04. The final test examined the entropy
of the cipher-text output for LEOPARD and AES at ten
rounds with a 256 byte packet size.
Summary of the experiments undertaken indicate that the
LEOPARD cryptographic primitive is just as suited for gen-
erating random output as AES from the preliminary statistical
analysis undertaken. This suggests that it is feasible to select
the LEOPARD cryptographic primitive to obtain a cipher-text
output comparable to the AES cryptographic primitive.
VII. DISCUSSION
This discussion relates the results obtained from the
experiments undertaken and applies the findings to the
problem formulation and problem analysis with priority on
the power consumed by the cryptographic primitives and how
it affect the context of tactical UAV.
A test was undertaken on a emulated test platform to
identify the affect of cryptographic services on the power
consumption of a tactical UAV, the investigation focused
on the power consumption of a limited battery supply for
streamed video data between the base-station and tactical
UAV. The Microchip PIC18F45K22 was selected as the
microcontroller for the operator and tactical UAV. The Serial
Peripheral Interface (SPI) is selected as the physical layer (i.e.
OSI model) to transmit and receive messages between each
microcontroller. The TinyAEAD construct was the selected
AEAD construct due to its flexibility and adaptability of
operating various cryptographic methods [15].
Metrics utilised for the test procedure are milliwatts (mW)
for the power consumed and seconds for the time sampled.
All timings are taken from the a real-world stopwatch.
Configuration of the components selected are as follows, the
crystal frequency selected is 16 MHz to replicate low powered
microcontrollers with packet payload sizes of 36, 52 and 84
bytes packet sizes. Table II tabulates the comparison between
LEOPARD and AES cryptographic primitives at three rounds
with various byte sized messages.
Table II
PACKET COUNT COMPARISON BETWEEN LEOPARD AND AES
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES IN A SIXTY SECOND TIME SAMPLE AT 16
MHZ CRYSTAL FREQUENCY
Payload
Size
(Bytes)
Number of
Packets
(AES)
Number of
Packets
(LEOPARD)
36 3392 3624
52 2462 2638
84 1550 1725
Results obtained show that the LEOPARD cryptographic
primitive has an increased number of packets received in
comparison to the AES cryptographic primitive; it can be
inferred that LEOPARD is better suited for the application
of tactical unmanned vehicles with the increased packet
throughput represented.
The impact on the operational and performance
characteristics of the tactical UAV using the selected
approaches indicates that both PSN and SPN design
paradigms have an effect on the total number of packets
received by the tactical UAV using TinyAEAD at ten rounds.
The percentage difference between the two cryptographic
primitives is 6.6% for 36 bytes, 6.9% difference for 52 bytes
and 10.7% difference for 84 bytes. This suggests that the
selection of cryptographic primitive has an influence on the
total amount of packets received.
The second test draws comparison of the time required to
to encrypt the streamed data from the UAV to the base-station
with LEOPARD and AES. Packet sizes of 256 byte and 1024
bytes to represent MAVlink and Ethernet like protocols. Table
III tabulates the results of LEOPARD and AES for streamed
data.
Table III
LATENCY INDUCED BY LEOPARD AND AES FOR VARIOUS STREAMED
PACKET LENGTHS AT 16 MHZ CRYSTAL FREQUENCY
Payload
Size
(Bytes)
Latency
AES
(ms)
Latency
LEOPARD
(ms)
128 35.1 31.8
256 65.8 59.5
1024 289.4 261.5
Data presented in Table III show that the latency induced
for LEOPARD operating at ten rounds for a 36 byte packet
size is reduced by 9.8% in comparison to AES; at 52 bytes
the difference in latency between LEOPARD and AES
was 10.2% and for 84 bytes the reduction in latency for
LEOPARD when compared to AES was 10.1%.
The power consumption of the LEOPARD and AES
cryptographic primitives was investigated to determine
how the design of the cryptographic primitives contributed
towards the power used by the computational device. For this
scenario, a unmanned vehicle is selected to represent a mobile
platform. Results presented represent the cost of the security
measures only. Figure 3 illustrates the power consumption of
LEOPARD and AES cryptographic primitives with various
crystal frequencies selected.
Figure 3. Comparison of power consumed of a mobile real-time system with
LEOPARD and AES cryptographic primitives at various crystal frequency
The results of the power consumption of the cryptographic
primitives in relation to the power consumed shows that
the mobile real-time system using LEOPARD cryptographic
primitive has a reduced power consumption in comparison
to AES. The difference between the two methods shows
that the consumption of the limited power supply of the
mobile platform would on average have a 8.5% reduction with
LEOPARD cryptographic primitive selected in comparison to
AES.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The LEOPARD cryptographic primitive presented in
this paper has been proposed; the LEOPARD and AES
cryptographic primitives show a strong statistical correlation
with a reduction in the processing time required to process
LEOPARD. The preliminary cryptanalysis undertaken, the
indication is that the LEOPARD cryptographic primitive is
a valid methodology for block cipher design as the results
obtained are comparable with AES.
The affect of the cryptographic service on the operational
and performance of the UAV has also been identified the
LEOPARD cryptographic primitives having an improved
throughput and reduced power consumption on average of
8% in comparison to AES. This suggests that cryptography
has an influence on the operational and performance of the
UAV and may impact on safety, reliability and availability.
Future work is to validate the LEOPARD on a real-world
test platform.
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